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PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION: ACHIEVING A
BALANCE BETWEEN USER PRIVACY AND
BEHAVIORAL TARGETING
Patrick Myers*
Websites and mobile applications provide immeasurable benefits to both users and
companies. These services often collect vast amounts of personal information from
the individuals that use them, including sensitive details such as Social Security
numbers, credit card information, and physical location. Personal data collection
and dissemination leave users vulnerable to various threats that arise from the
invasion of their privacy, particularly because users are often ignorant of the exis-
tence or extent of these practices. Current privacy law does not provide users with
adequate protection from the risks attendant to the collection and dissemination of
their personal information. This Note advocates a comprehensive solution: a fed-
eral statute that introduces a contractual mentality to encourage informed consent
to companies’ data collection and dissemination practices.
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INTRODUCTION
Between February and May of 2015, a criminal organization stole
personal financial information from over 100,000 individuals off of
the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) website, which it then used to
claim tax refunds under several of those individuals’ names.1 That
data also allowed the criminal organization to open bank accounts
and credit lines, and claim additional tax refunds.2 The criminals
then used that personal information, which included Social Secur-
ity numbers, birth dates, and physical addresses, to request
taxpayers’ forms.3 They also answered the victims’ personal identity
verification questions, which enabled them to steal more sensitive
financial information, such as salary data and individuals’ taxpayer
deductions.4 This was particularly troubling considering that the
victims would have expected the IRS to adequately protect their pri-
vacy. These large-scale data breaches, accomplished with users’
personal information, have become increasingly common in recent
years.
The advent of modern technology has changed how people go
about their lives. They stay connected through social media, con-
duct business online, and on the whole, expedite their daily
activities. Smartphones and other mobile devices, in particular, al-
low access to these abilities at all times. Many users are unaware that
the benefits they derive from this technology come at the expense
of their privacy. Companies have exploited the ubiquity of Internet
usage through the collection and dissemination of users’ personal
information. But, these practices also provide many advantages to
users such as efficient, personalized online experiences through be-
havioral marketing and advertising. They also yield a significant
source of profits for companies not only through targeted advertis-
ing, but also from the tangible value of aggregated personal
information.
Unfortunately, these practices pose serious risks to users’ privacy.
Besides an invasion of privacy, the collection and dissemination of
personal information can result in identity theft, financial fraud,
discrimination, and even physical harm. Users are not fully in-
formed of these risks because of the flawed nature of user
agreements and inadequate consent to privacy policies. Companies’
data collection and dissemination practices are outlined in their
1. Jose Pagliery, Criminals Use IRS Website to Steal Data on 104,000 People, CNN MONEY
(May 26, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/26/pf/taxes/irs-website-data-hack/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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privacy policies, which are often written in lengthy, complex
legalese. Users often miss these policies, which are typically located
on a separate page of a website or application (app). Many users
view agreeing to a company’s privacy policy as an obstacle to their
online activity, simply clicking “I Agree” without reading the
agreement.
This Note describes the current practices surrounding the collec-
tion and dissemination of personal information, examining the
benefits and drawbacks to both users and companies. Taking the
interests of users and companies into account, this Note seeks to
develop a solution that will adequately protect individual privacy
without disrupting the everyday use of technology. Part I explains
the mechanics of collecting and disseminating user information,
along with its attendant benefits and risks. Part II discusses the cur-
rently applicable law and its shortcomings in addressing the
problems laid out in Part I. Part III proposes a comprehensive statu-
tory remedy that strikes a balance between user privacy and
company interests.
I. MECHANICS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS OF COLLECTING AND
DISSEMINATING USER INFORMATION
The collection and dissemination of personal information is now
a pervasive component of users’ online experiences. This Part will
explore the mechanics of how companies and third parties collect
and disseminate users’ information. It will also examine the advan-
tages and disadvantages that these practices create for both users
and companies.
A. Mechanics of Collection and Dissemination
Websites and mobile applications collect users’ personal informa-
tion by using several methods. The most common (and visible)
approach is to compile information through forms.5 On many web-
sites and apps, users consciously enter personal information such as
names, addresses, phone numbers, and employment details.6 This
represents a fairly straightforward way for companies to gather per-
sonal information. Not all data collection, however, is apparent to
5. Corey Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit: The Collection, Dissemination, and Tagging of Person-
ally Identifying Information, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 553, 563 (2008).
6. Id.
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the user. In addition to this conscious distribution, users may unwit-
tingly give up personal information just by visiting the site or app.
When a user visits a website, it may place “cookies,” small data
files, on a visitor’s browser to allow the site to identify the user on
his or her next visit to the site.7 The next time that user visits the
website, the cookies relay the relevant information to the site
owner.8 In so doing, cookies make Web browsing more efficient for
the user and the website; for example, users can stay logged in to a
site rather than entering their login information each time they
visit a new page.9 Websites also use cookies to track browser his-
tory.10 The combination of cookies and referrer information, which
provides websites with the last URL visited by the user, allows site
owners to track the sites visited by any given user.11
In addition to placing their own cookies on users’ browsers, web-
sites frequently allow third parties, such as online advertisers, to do
the same.12 These third parties use cookies to track users’ browsing
history and assemble profiles of each user.13 Third party companies
can also purchase personal information collected through forms,
cookies, or other methods, from the websites that users visit.14 The
collection and dissemination practices of these third parties create
various privacy concerns, particularly since users are unaware of the
identities and purposes of those entities. This lack of knowledge
vitiates any explicit or implicit consent on the part of the users.
Recently, companies have started to move away from using cook-
ies and have begun to employ other methods to track users’
activities and collect their information.15 This is because cookies
have become less effective in the face of browser settings that allow
users to limit or block cookies.16 People also increasingly use mobile
7. Luke J. Albrecht, Online Marketing: The Use of Cookies and Remedies for Internet Users, 36
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 422 (2003).
8. Stephanie A. Kuhlmann, Do Not Track Me Online: The Logistical Struggles over the Right
“To Be Let Alone” Online, 22 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 229, 235 (2011).
9. See id.
10. See Albrecht, supra note 7, at 422.
11. Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Deconstructing Code, 6 YALE J. L. & TECH. 277, 299
(2004).
12. See Raizel Liebler & Keidra Chaney, Google Analytics: Analyzing the Latest Wave of Legal
Concerns for Google in the U.S. and the E.U., 7 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 135, 139 (2010).
13. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Informa-
tion Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1409–10 (2001).
14. See Ciocchetti, supra note 5, at 581.
15. See Brian Boland, Facebook Exec: Cookies Don’t Cut It Anymore for Online Ad Measurement;
Why the Industry Needs to Replace Cookies With People, ADVERTISING AGE (Mar. 21, 2014), http://
adage.com/article/digitalnext/cookies-cut-anymore-online-ad-measurement/292225/.
16. Olga Kharif, The Cookies You Can’t Crumble, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 21,
2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-08-21/facebook-google-go-beyond-cook-
ies-to-reap-data-for-advertisers.
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devices, most of which do not allow applications to utilize cookies.17
Advertisers have adapted to these changes by using other methods
such as “people-based” measuring,18 which allows companies to
keep track of users’ activities across different devices, such as com-
puters, tablets, and mobile phones.19 These alternate methods
present their own advantages and disadvantages. Although alter-
nate methods offer more effective behavioral advertising, they may
also be more difficult for users to disable, potentially making anony-
mous browsing impossible.20
Companies typically inform individuals of data collection and dis-
semination by detailing such practices in their terms and
conditions. Usually, companies urge users to accept their terms and
conditions before browsing their sites and using their services.21
Often, the mode of acceptance is to click an “I accept” button.
Some websites and apps do not require explicit acceptance, but
rather state their terms and conditions on a separate page.22 Ad-
ding further complication, websites’ and apps’ terms and
conditions are often written in lengthy, complex legalese.23 Not-
withstanding the privacy issues these practices implicate, which will
be discussed later, it is questionable whether these user agreements
effectively notify visitors about data collection and dissemination
practices.  In fact, many users view the acceptance of terms and con-
ditions as an obstacle to their online activity, not explicit consent to
compile and sell their personal information.24 Although the con-
tract law principle that failure to read an agreement is no excuse25
may have some merit, the methods by which websites and apps ob-
tain consent are intrinsically flawed. And in the case of third-party
cookies, consent is arguably nonexistent.
17. Id.
18. See Boland, supra note 15.
19. See Adit Abhyankar, Continued Growth of Cross-Device Advertising and Other 2015 Predic-
tions, PERFORMANCEIN (Dec. 29, 2014), http://performancein.com/news/2014/12/29/
continued-growth-cross-device-advertising-and-other-2015-predictions/.
20. See Kharif, supra note 16.
21. See Ciocchetti, supra note 5, at 561.
22. See id. at 586.
23. See id. at 587–89.
24. See id. at 561.
25. See, e.g., 27 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 70:113 (4th ed. 1990) (“A
party is not excused from a contract simply for not having read the agreement before signing
and accepting its benefits. The failure to read an agreement . . . is no excuse for pleading
ignorance of the contents of the unread contract.”).
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B. Benefits to Users and Companies
The collection and dissemination of personal information can be
mutually beneficial for both individuals and companies. One major
benefit is a personalized and efficient Internet browsing experi-
ence. Because websites place cookies on visitors’ browsers, it allows
the sites to recognize each person the next time he or she visits.
These first-party cookies are commonly used by e-commerce com-
panies for identification purposes.26 Websites originally employed
cookies to facilitate the now-familiar online shopping cart, which
stores customers’ item selections as they browse an e-commerce
site.27 First-party cookies offer a more efficient online experience by
allowing websites to register user activity. Without cookies, every
visit to a webpage would be treated as the user’s first, “like visiting a
store where the shopkeeper had amnesia.”28 In short, cookies pro-
vide users with a personalized and efficient browsing experience
and enable websites to take note of these preferences.
Data collection and dissemination also result in tailored market-
ing and advertising for Internet users. E-commerce businesses, such
as Amazon, can record a user’s browsing history across multiple
sites and advertise based on his or her preferences. Third-party
tracking methods, such as cookies, allow companies with whom the
user is not interacting to similarly monitor online activity and tailor
advertisements. Websites can also disseminate user information to
enable third parties to target their advertisements. Facebook, for
example, uses information that members provide to advertise for
other companies.29 This behaviorally targeted advertising creates
benefits for consumers and businesses—consumers see products re-
lated to their individualized interests—which helps make online
shopping more efficient. They may also discover new interests
based on their activities and purchases. Businesses, for their part,
can directly market to individuals, exposing consumers to products
for which they are actively shopping and also to related products
they may not have been considering. Moreover, companies can
change their websites based on personal information to improve
user experiences.30 For instance, news services such as The Washing-
ton Post and Reuters offer personalized websites or apps that show
26. See Ciocchetti, supra note 5, at 565.
27. See Kesan & Shah, supra note 11, at 298–99.
28. John Schwartz, Giving Web a Memory Cost Its Users Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2001, at
A1.
29. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/advertising
(last visited Jan. 3, 2016).
30. Liebler & Chaney, supra note 12, at 142.
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news stories relevant to each individual subscriber, taking into ac-
count personal interests, articles a person has read in the past, and
location.31 Companies may also modify promotions to accommo-
date aggregate consumer trends.32
Due to tailored marketing and advertising, companies and third
parties derive significant economic benefit from collecting and dis-
tributing users’ personal information. As discussed above,
businesses extract value from observing market trends, and more
specifically, by aggregating personal information.33 Compiling per-
sonally identifiable information benefits businesses because “it
raises the probability that advertising will translate into sales, and it
cuts the expense of advertising to uninterested consumers.”34 Data
collection therefore facilitates a cost-efficient advertising model
that is increasingly necessary to remain competitive.35
In addition to these benefits from tailored marketing and adver-
tising, the collection of personal information can produce further
economic gains through its dissemination. Companies amass indi-
vidual profiles which include information such as “education levels,
occupation, height, weight, political affiliation, ethnicity,
race, hobbies, and net worth.”36 These digital “dossiers” are com-
monly and freely sold to other companies.37 As a consequence of
each of the aforementioned strategies, businesses can realize con-
crete economic benefits from gathering and selling users’ personal
information within the bounds of any applicable privacy laws.
31. See Russell Adams, Paper Starts New Website, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 11,
2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704265604576136120092550768;
Eric Blattberg, Reuters TV Aims to Personalize News Broadcasts, DIGIDAY (Nov. 11, 2014), http://
digiday.com/publishers/reuters-tv/. For another example of companies using personal in-
formation to enhance user experience, see Kathleen Chaykowski, Facebook Shakes Up News Feed
in Push to Show More Relevant Videos, FORBES (June 29, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kathleenchaykowski/2015/06/29/facebook-shakes-up-news-feed-in-push-to-show-more-rele-
vant-videos/ (describing how Facebook tracks its members’ actions related to videos in their
news feed—such as whether they turned on the volume or watched them in full screen—to
determine what videos they will see and where in their feed the videos will appear).
32. Kuhlmann, supra note 8, at 236–37.
33. John T. Soma et al., Corporate Privacy Trend: The “Value” of Personally Identifiable Infor-
mation (“Pii”) Equals the “Value” of Financial Assets, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (2009).
34. Id. at 9.
35. Id. at 10.
36. Solove, supra note 13, at 1409–10.
37. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclo-
sure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 970 (2003).
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C. Privacy Concerns and Drawbacks
Although the collection and dissemination of personal informa-
tion produces benefits for both users and companies, these
practices also give rise to several disadvantages, including privacy
concerns. The invasion of a person’s privacy is primarily an intangi-
ble harm, which makes it difficult to quantify.38 But, companies’
data collection and dissemination practices also create certain tan-
gible risks in the form of identity theft, financial fraud, and physical
harms.
As mentioned above, users may not be aware of, or consent to
the compilation and distribution of their personal information. Evi-
dence indicates that Internet users do not read a site’s terms and
conditions,39 but rather click “Accept” in order to move on to their
intended online activity. Even if some users are aware that websites
compile their personal information, they may underestimate the
extent to which it is collected and used.40 Without full knowledge of
the intrusions of their privacy, users cannot effectively safeguard
against attendant financial or physical harms.
Privacy concerns are particularly salient when third parties are
involved. When users enter personal information into Web forms,
they acknowledge that the sites are collecting their data. It is usually
not apparent from websites’ disclosures, however, that the sites may
sell this data to third parties.41 This is because third-party data col-
lection does not involve direct consent on the part of the user.42
Even if the collection by or dissemination to third parties is dis-
closed in a website’s terms and conditions, the purported consent is
attenuated. Most users do not read websites’ or apps’ privacy poli-
cies, which means that companies sell users’ personal information
without their knowledge or explicit consent.43 These aspects of per-
sonal data collection undermine the legitimacy of the entire
practice. They call into question whether the goals of convenience,
38. See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1808
(2010).
39. See Rebecca Smithers, Terms and Conditions: Not Reading the Small Print Can Mean Big
Problems, THE GUARDIAN (May 11, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/money/2011/may/
11/terms-conditions-small-print-big-problems (reporting a survey of British Web users that
showed only seven percent read online terms and conditions before accepting); see also Jakob
Nielsen, How Little Do Users Read?, NIELSEN NORMAN GROUP (May 6, 2008), http://www.nn
group.com/articles/how-little-do-users-read/ (citing an empirical study demonstrating that,
on average, Web users only read about twenty percent of the words on a Web page).
40. See Ciocchetti, supra note 5, at 574–75.
41. See id. at 578.
42. See id.
43. See id.
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efficiency, and economic benefits for users and companies justify
the (sometimes nonconsensual) methods of data compilation and
distribution.
One prevalent concern is that aggregating user information in-
creases the risk of identity theft and financial fraud. Although
disclosing individual pieces of information may not present a strong
possibility of identity theft, the gathering of data into digital profiles
intensifies this threat.44 For instance, although an identity thief
could not accomplish much with an email address, he could poten-
tially cause severe financial harm by hacking into a bank account if
he combined the individual’s email address, Social Security num-
ber, and mother’s maiden name. Although a user may take
extensive steps to avoid sharing information with any one site that is
sufficient for identity theft, aggregation circumvents precautionary
measures.
The danger of identity theft is further compounded if companies
do not take adequate measures to protect users’ data. And unfortu-
nately, the frequency of large-scale data breaches has risen in
recent years.45 Several corporations with broad consumer bases
have fallen victim to breaches involving the theft of the sensitive
personal information of millions of people.46  Taken in context of
the pervasive collection and dissemination of personal information,
these breaches present a serious threat to consumer privacy, as well
as to businesses’ competitive advantage. First, data breaches expose
consumers to a material risk of identity fraud.47  Users cannot effec-
tively safeguard against this privacy concern because their data may
be sold to almost any entity.48 Therefore, users cannot take appro-
priate precautions to ensure that only companies zealously
guarding their personal information have possession of it. In other
cases, users cannot avoid giving up that data because entities such
44. See id. at 575–76.
45. Elise Viebeck, FBI: Data Breaches “Increasing Substantially,” THE HILL (May 14, 2015),
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/242110-fbi-official-data-breaches-increasing-substan
tially.
46. See, e.g., Paul Ziobro & Danny Yadron, Target Now Says 70 Million People Hit in Data
Breach, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527
02303754404579312232546392464 (discussing how up to seventy million people were af-
fected by Target’s data breach, which involved the theft of information such as debit and
credit card accounts, names, mailing addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses);
Malathi Nayak, U.S. FCC Imposes $25 Million Fine on AT&T Over Customer Data Breach, REUTERS
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/08/us-at-t-settlement-dataprotec
tion-idUSKBN0MZ1XX20150408 (noting that around 280,000 AT&T customers were af-
fected by a data breach which involved disclosure of names, Social Security numbers, and
other account information).
47. See Soma et al., supra note 33, at 11.
48. See id. at 581.
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as the IRS require people to disclose it.  The IRS theft discussed
earlier shows the extent of the financial risks to which individuals
are exposed, particularly when a company does not sufficiently pro-
tect its users.49 Second, these large-scale data breaches affect
businesses, as the failure to protect personal information may cause
consumers to use other services instead.50  Large-scale data
breaches demonstrate how hackers may exploit the practices of
gathering and distributing personal information and thereby simul-
taneously harm a significant number of users.
In addition to financial harms, the collection and dissemination
of personal information can also result in “physical harm, black-
mail, discrimination, and emotional or mental distress from
embarrassment.”51  Since digital profiles are readily available for
sale, any interested party can purchase an individual’s personal in-
formation.52 This has resulted in criminal cases in which the
perpetrator gained access to the victim’s whereabouts.53  Further,
there is a risk of employment discrimination when employers dis-
cover employees’ personal information, and users may also suffer
from mental distress or embarrassment from the public disclosure
of sensitive information.54 For instance, a group of hackers targeted
the website Ashley Madison in July of 2015 and released sensitive
personal details about thirty-one million users, including their
email addresses, residences, and sexual preferences.55 These poten-
tial abuses of possessing another’s personal information exemplify
the risks of companies collecting and disseminating user data.
49. See supra Introduction; see also, e.g., Brianna Ehley, Watchdog: IRS Ignored Warnings
Before Getting Hacked, THE FISCAL TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.thefisc altimes.com/
2015/06/02/Watchdog-IRS-Ignored-Warnings-Getting-Hacked (“[T]he IRS had failed to act
on a handful of recommendations the [Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration]
had previously made to address serious security weaknesses within the agency’s databases.”).
50. Charles Arthur, Sony Suffers Second Data Breach with Theft of 25m More User Details, THE
GUARDIAN (May 3, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/ 2011/may/03/
sony-data-breach-online-entertainment.
51. Kuhlmann, supra note 8, at 241.
52. See Ciocchetti, supra note 5, at 581.
53. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding the conviction
of a former Social Security Administration employee under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act for accessing the personal information of seventeen people for nonbusiness reasons);
Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Online Firm Gave Victim’s Data to Killer, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jan. 6, 2002),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-01-06/news/0201060305_1_pretexting-docu
search-amy-boyer (reporting how a woman was murdered by a former classmate who pur-
chased her personal information online).
54. See Kuhlmann, supra note 8, at 246.
55. Dina Spector, A ‘Cheating’ Husband Reveals What it Feels Like to be Exposed in the Ashley
Madison Hack, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/ what-it-
feels-like-to-be-exposed-in-ashley-madison-data-breach-2015-9?r=UK&IR=T (describing a hus-
band and wife’s experience after their personal information was leaked).
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Although collecting and disseminating personal information cre-
ates benefits for both users and companies, the concerns and
potential abuses that the practice raises warrants some manner of
protection.  At the core of these harms is that users, who have the
greatest incentives to protect their information, are not fully aware
of the risks of data collection and dissemination. Companies’ pri-
vacy policies do not adequately notify users, and users usually do
not recognize the significance of privacy policies. Websites and apps
“generally [only] have to follow privacy policy procedures in order
to avoid legal trouble,” rather than to ensure that users understand
and consent to such procedures.56 Large-scale data breaches aggra-
vate this consumer information gap, indicating that popular
companies are not taking adequate measures to protect customers’
sensitive information. And, in light of the ubiquitous practice of
selling personal data, users cannot depend on websites or apps to
protect sensitive information.
D. Intensified Need for Comprehensive Protection in Light
of Modern Technology
It is particularly important for Congress to provide today’s users
with comprehensive protection because emerging user trends to-
ward mobile browsing exacerbate the drawbacks of collecting and
disseminating personal information.  Since 2007, global mobile us-
age has quadrupled, surpassing global desktop usage, which also
rose steadily during the same time period.57 According to one re-
port, “nearly one-fifth of cell owners (17%) use their cell phone for
most of their online browsing.”58 This trend warrants renewed con-
sideration of federal, all-encompassing consumer privacy protection
laws, because mobile browsing presents more acute risks for users.
Mobile devices provide companies with valuable information,
such as “contact numbers, location, and a unique identifying num-
ber that cannot be changed or turned off.”59 Because of this
valuable data and the recent trends in mobile application usage,
56. Ciocchetti, supra note 5, at 581.
57. Danyl Bosomworth, Mobile Marketing Statistics 2015, SMART INIGHTS (July 22, 2015),
http://www.smartinsights.com/mobile-marketing/mobile-marketing-analytics/mobile-mar-
keting-statistics.
58. Jan Lauren Boyles et al., Privacy and Data Management on Mobile Devices, PEW RE-
SEARCH CENTER (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/09/05/privacy-and-data-
management-on-mobile-devices/.
59. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency
and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 281, 296
(2012).
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behaviorally targeted advertisements will increasingly focus on mo-
bile users.  Due to the ubiquity of smartphones and similar mobile
devices, it is paramount that consumers fully comprehend the pri-
vacy policies of the applications they browse.  For example, a
significant number of popular mobile applications recently dissemi-
nated “user phones’ unique device IDs to third parties without the
users’ awareness or consent.”60 Such a lack of knowledge prevents
users from proactively taking precautions to avoid the distribution
of personal data to undesirable third parties.  Given the rise in mo-
bile usage, the widespread data collection and dissemination
practices of apps are particularly troubling.  According to a recent
study, the overwhelming majority of apps, both paid and free, ex-
hibit behaviors that threaten users’ privacy.61  These “risky
behaviors . . . included location tracking, accessing the device’s ad-
dress book or contact list, single sign-on via social networks,
identifying the user or the phone’s unique identifier (UDID), in-
app purchases, and sharing data with ad networks and analytics
companies.”62
Although web-based browsing presents similar risks, mobile de-
vices amplify the dangers of data aggregation and distribution.  For
instance, the potential for physical harm increases if the perpetra-
tor knows the exact location of his or her victim, as opposed to only
a home address or place of employment.63  Mobile devices can pro-
vide such information—and many do—since most people carry
their phones with them at all times.64  One recent study found that
apps almost continually track a person’s location: for instance, the
Facebook app checked a user’s location more than once per min-
ute.65 A default app on a Google Android phone “checked a user’s
location one million times in one month.”66  In addition to these
practices, new people-based marketing methods make it almost im-
possible for users to maintain their privacy and safeguard sensitive
60. Id. at 297.
61. Neil McAllister, How Many Mobile Apps Collect Data on Users? Oh . . . Nearly All of Them,
THE REGISTER (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/02/21/appthority_app_
privacy_study/ (“95 per cent of the top 200 free apps for iOS and Android exhibited at least
one risky behavior. But so did 80 per cent of the top 200 paid apps, meaning pretty much all
apps should be considered suspect.”).
62. Id.
63. See supra Part I.C.
64. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 59, at 296–97.
65. Chris Smith, The Amount of Personal Data Some Android Apps Collect is Absolutely Shock-
ing, BGR (Dec. 17, 2014), http://bgr.com/2014/12/17/android-apps-personal-data-and-
location/ (“The Google Play Store tracked a user’s phone 10 times per minute at certain
times.”).
66. Id.
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personal information.67 In part, this is because mobile technology is
a more recent development; users are not as well-versed in how to
prevent companies from collecting and disseminating their per-
sonal information.  Although some Web users may know how to
disable cookies, they likely cannot translate these prevention tech-
niques to their mobile devices.  Even when users take steps to avoid
tracking, their apps can still circumvent these measures.68  In some
cases, users might not be able to disable applications’ collection
and dissemination practices.69  Users must, therefore, rely on legal
protections to insulate themselves from the problems created by
the collection and dissemination of their personal information.
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF APPLICABLE LAW
Currently, there is no uniform legal response to these issues.  Al-
though members of Congress have introduced several bills, no
federal law directly addresses the problems discussed in Part I.  This
Part examines the legal concerns related to companies’ collection
and dissemination of users’ personal information.  It also considers
the nature and extent of legal protections available to users: tort
and contract law remedies, several proposed statutes that Congress
did not enact, existing statutes with limited applicability, and Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) regulatory efforts.
A. Legal Notions of Privacy
The concept of privacy has permeated American jurisprudence
for over a century.  In 1888, Judge Thomas M. Cooley articulated
the quintessential legal definition of privacy as “the right to be let
alone.”70  Several years later, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
announced a common law right to privacy in their influential (and
aptly named) article, The Right to Privacy.71  They posited that this
67. See Kharif, supra note 16.
68. See Peter Sayer, Android Apps Exploit Permissions to Access Personal Info, Researchers Find,
INFOWORLD (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2859565/mobile-technol-
ogy/android-apps-exploit-permissions-to-access-personal-info-researchers-find.html (“One of
the few options users have to avoid this tracking is a switch in the “Google Settings” app to
reset their phone’s advertising ID. That’s not much help, though, as apps have other ways to
identify users.”).
69. See Kharif, supra note 16.
70. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
71. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
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right was necessary to preserve a person’s private and domestic
life.72  Warren and Brandeis argued that the right to be let alone
had become a socially recognizable necessity on par with the right
to own property and protections against bodily injury.73  This indi-
vidual right arose from a broader principle of privacy, separate
from principles of contract or private property.74  Brandeis de-
scribed the right to privacy as “the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.”75  The Supreme Court
has recognized this foundational principle, interpreting the U.S.
Constitution to guarantee personal privacy in certain circumstances
such as in the home, in religion, and in private speech.76 In Griswold
v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the constitu-
tional right to privacy is “legitimate.”77
Professor William Prosser described four separate torts for the
invasion of a person’s privacy: (1) intrusion upon the seclusion of
another; (2) appropriation of another’s name or likeness; (3) pub-
lic disclosure of private facts; and (4) publicity which places
another in a false light before the public.78  These torts, while dis-
similar, are all based on “the right to be let alone.”79  Most states
have adopted these invasion of privacy torts through common law
or statutes.80
Despite the ostensible availability of privacy tort law remedies,
courts have imposed certain requirements that limit the feasibility
of these remedies in protecting against companies’ collection and
dissemination of personal information.  Many courts have not rec-
ognized privacy rights in voluntarily disclosed information, unless
the information contains confidential characteristics or implicates a
fiduciary relationship.81  Courts have also looked at an individual’s
72. See id. at 195.
73. Id. at 193–95.
74. Id. at 213.
75. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV.  These guarantees do not protect a person from
invasions of privacy by private parties. See also, Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656
(1980).
77. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
78. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
79. Id.
80. See PRIVACILLA.ORG, THE PRIVACY TORTS: HOW U.S. STATE LAW QUIETLY LEADS THE
WAY IN PRIVACY PROTECTION 19–24 (2002), http://www.privacilla.org/releases/Torts_Report.
pdf (listing exemplary cases, statutes, and other sources from each state that illustrate that
state’s approach to privacy tort protection).
81. Kuhlmann, supra note 8, at 233.
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expectation of privacy in evaluating whether his or her privacy was
invaded.82
Common law privacy torts cannot adequately protect against the
collection and dissemination of personal information.83  As one
commentator noted, “[a]dvances in the technology of surveillance
and the recording, storage, and retrieval of information have made
it either impossible or extremely costly for individuals to protect the
same level of privacy that was once enjoyed.”84  In the context of
websites and mobile apps, users arguably have relinquished their
privacy expectations.85  Users voluntarily disclose personal informa-
tion in many instances.86  Furthermore, when a person uses a
website or app, he or she either explicitly or implicitly agrees to a
company’s terms and conditions.87  Since these agreements inform
users of personal information collection and dissemination prac-
tices, they have vitiated their expectation of privacy.
One concern with this conclusion is that terms and conditions
already raise issues of informed consent,88 so whether a user can
give up an expectation of privacy in this way is debatable.  Another
concern is that even users who are conscious of collection and dis-
semination risks will struggle to fully insulate themselves from
ceding their expectation of privacy.  As discussed above, new meth-
ods such as people-based marketing may make anonymous
browsing impossible.89  Unlike cookies, these techniques cannot be
disabled by users.90  Accordingly, users will be forced to sacrifice the
convenience of modern technology, such as tablets and mobile de-
vices, in exchange for their privacy.  Given the pervasiveness and
82. See, e.g., Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374
(D.N.J. 2012) (holding that a woman “may have had a reasonable expectation that her
Facebook posting would remain private, considering that she actively took steps to protect
her Facebook page from public viewing”).  The court described consistent case law on two
ends of the privacy spectrum: “there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for material
posted to an unprotected website that anyone can view,” while “there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy for individual, password-protected online communications.” Id. at 373.
83. See Citron, supra note 38, at 1809.
84. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 465 (1980).  This con-
cern is even more prevalent 35 years later, with all of the technological improvements that
have occurred in the interim. See, e.g., Kharif, supra note 16.
85. See Miguel Helft & Claire Cain Miller, 1986 Privacy Law Is Outrun by the Web, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/technology/10privacy.html
(“Last year, for example, the Justice Department argued in court that cellphone users had
given up the expectation of privacy about their location by voluntarily giving that informa-
tion to carriers.”).
86. See Ciocchetti, supra note 5.
87. See id. at 561, 586.
88. See supra Part I.C.
89. See Kharif, supra note 16.
90. See id.
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necessity of these technologies, online activity will likely come at the
expense of a person’s expectation of privacy.
The collection and dissemination of a person’s personal informa-
tion controverts this fundamental value of privacy, a principle
essential to society that has been recognized by legal scholars for
over one hundred years.91  This value, however, is not only recog-
nized by legal scholars. The Supreme Court has also affirmed the
legitimacy of the right of privacy.92 To secure this right, U.S. com-
mon law has provided several torts to protect individuals against the
invasion of their privacy.93  Although well-intentioned, these privacy
torts do not adequately safeguard users from the collection and dis-
semination of their personal information.
B. Limited Reach of Contract Law
In essence, the interaction between a user and an online pro-
vider (whether a website or a mobile application) is a contractual
agreement: an exchange of online services for something of value
from the user.  The user’s contribution may be monetary, such as a
subscription to a website or app, or intangible, in the form of his or
her personal information.94 With the development of the Internet
and its role in commerce, online transactions with standard boiler-
plate contracts have become increasingly prevalent.95  Courts have
applied traditional contract law principles to these transactions.96  A
standard principle of contract law is that “a party may be bound by
an instrument which he has not read.”97  Application of these tradi-
tional principles to the online context, however, may not always be
appropriate. For example, two general types of online agreements
implicate the problems raised by lack of informed user consent:98
click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements.
A “click-wrap agreement” prompts the user to click an on-screen
button to indicate that he or she has read the terms and conditions
91. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 71, at 193–95.
92. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
93. See Prosser, supra note 78, at 389.
94. See Soma et al., supra note 33, at 9–10.
95. Nathan J. Davis, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 577, 577 (2007).
96. See generally Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002).
97. John D. Calamari, Duty to Read: A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341, 341
(1974).
98. See supra Part I.C.
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and assents to the agreement.99  These agreements are usually used
in connection with software licenses. Courts have almost universally
upheld the validity of click-wrap agreements, “settl[ing] on a
mechanical assent analysis that only seeks to determine whether or
not the ‘I Agree’ button was indeed clicked.”100  In the few instances
that courts have refused to enforce the terms of click-wrap agree-
ments, the analysis did not hinge on whether clicking a button was
assent to a contract.101  In a “browse-wrap agreement” a user, simply
by visiting or using a website, agrees to be bound to the website’s
terms and conditions.102  For these agreements, there is no active
manifestation of assent.103  Courts, however, have not drawn much
of a distinction between click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements, re-
sulting in the broad enforcement of both.104  For such online
contracts, courts look at whether a user had actual or constructive
notice of the terms and whether he or she then assented to them;
usually only unconscionable provisions are struck down.105
While contract law does provide a baseline, it applies only where
there is an actual transaction.  When a user is simply browsing a
website and the website uses cookies to collect personal informa-
tion, there is an exchange of that information for services that
courts do not view as a contractual agreement.  The few cases where
courts have invalidated browse-wrap agreements share one com-
mon feature: “a point in time that the court could specifically
identify as the moment when notice should have been provided,
such as completing a sale . . . or downloading software.”106  It is
therefore difficult for courts to find a lack of actual or constructive
notice for typical Web or mobile use.107  In the context of websites
and mobile apps collecting and disseminating personal informa-
tion, users only have a resort to contractual remedies when there is
an egregious lack of notice or a provision that violates public pol-
icy.108  Despite the similarity of privacy policies to contracts,
99. Michelle Garcia, Browsewrap: A Unique Solution to the Slippery Slope of the Clickwrap Co-
nundrum, 36 CAMPBELL L. REV. 31, 35 (2013).
100. Davis, supra note 95, at 598.
101. Id. at 582 (“Instead, these courts either refused to enforce the agreements because
there was insufficient evidence of clicking, or voided the terms based on traditional contract
doctrines.”).
102. Garcia, supra note 99, at 35–36.
103. See id. at 36.
104. Id. at 55.
105. See Davis, supra note 95, at 583.
106. Garcia, supra note 99, at 55.
107. See id.
108. See Davis, supra note 95, at 583.
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“contract law . . . plays hardly any role in the protection of informa-
tion privacy, at least vis-a`-vis websites with privacy policies.”109
Accordingly, users whose personal information has been unknow-
ingly collected or disseminated must hope that statutory or
regulatory mandates govern their situation.110
C. Statutory Protections and Failed Legislative Attempts
There is no comprehensive federal statutory scheme that directly
addresses the problems created by the collection and dissemination
of users’ information.  For the most part, Congress has left this mat-
ter to the discretion of the FTC.  In recent years, however, Congress
has attempted to address these issues on several occasions, none of
them successful.  In 2011, Representative Jackie Speier introduced
the Do Not Track Me Online Act.111  This statute would have au-
thorized the FTC to set standards for a user opt-out function, which
would have allowed online users to prevent companies from collect-
ing or disseminating their personal information.112  The Act
protected personal data such as a user’s name, government identifi-
cation numbers, financial and medical information, race, religious
affiliation, and sexual orientation.113  Covered entities were obli-
gated to comply with a user’s decision to employ the Do Not Track
mechanism.114  The Act further required companies to disclose
their current information collection and dissemination practices to
users.  It also created a civil cause of action where state attorneys
general could sue on behalf of resident users to prevent further
violations, ensure compliance, or impose civil penalties.115  The Act
did not cover entities storing information from fewer than 15,000
individuals, as long as the entities did not (1) collect information
on more than 10,000 individuals during a twelve month period, (2)
“collect or store sensitive information,” and (3) “use covered infor-
mation to study, monitor, or analyze the behavior of individuals as
109. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 596 (2014) (“Contract law litigation theories have barely been at-
tempted, as the number of cases involving these theories has been exceedingly low over the
past fifteen to twenty years after the rise of privacy policies.”).
110. See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet Privacy: The
Past, Present, and Future of the Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD. L. REV. 452, 477 (2013).
111. Do Not Track Me Online Act, H.R. 654, 112th Cong. (2011).
112. Id. § 3.
113. Id. § 2.
114. Id. § 3(a).
115. Id. § 5.
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[their] primary business.”116  Although privacy advocates supported
the Act, it faced opposition from the advertising industry and died
in committee.117
In 2011, Senators John Kerry and John McCain proposed the
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act to “establish a regulatory
framework for the comprehensive protection of personal data for
individuals under the aegis of the Federal Trade Commission.”118
The bill would have required covered entities to provide users with
clear notice and an explanation of their information collection
practices.119  Although it would have provided users with an opt-out
choice for data collection and dissemination, it did not allow for a
Do Not Track mechanism.120  The bill also prohibited a private
cause of action, leaving enforcement to the FTC and state attorneys
general.121  Unlike the Do Not Track Me Online Act, this bill re-
ceived support from businesses and the advertising industry and
criticism from consumer and privacy advocates.122 Despite having
bipartisan support, this bill also died without a vote in Congress.
In 2013, Representative Hank Johnson introduced the Applica-
tion Privacy, Protection, and Security Act of 2013 (APPS Act).123
This Act required mobile apps to receive permission from users
before collecting data, explain their collection and dissemination
practices, and allow users to request that apps delete their data.124
This proposal was significant because it was the first federal statute
that would have applied to mobile applications. It would have pro-
vided app users with significant protection and a certain amount of
control over apps’ use of their data. The proposal had several draw-
backs, however, as it applied only to apps, leaving websites
unregulated.125  It was also unfavorable to advertising companies,
116. Id. § 2(2).
117. See Wendy Davis, Privacy ‘Track Bill’ Draws Key Support, MEDIAPOST (Feb. 11, 2011),
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/144858/ (detailing support from privacy
advocates and critiques from advertising industry representatives).
118. 157 CONG. REC. S2387 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 2011).
119. Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. § 201 (2011).
120. See infra Part II.D.
121. S. 799 §§ 403, 405(b)(1), 406.
122. See Cecilia Kang, Senators Introduce Internet Privacy Bill, THE WASHINGTON POST (April
12, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/senators-introduce-in-
ternet-privacy-bill/2011/04/12/AFL0CjRD_blog.html (reporting that the bill garnered
support from Microsoft, Intel, and eBay, although consumer advocacy groups felt it did not
provide enough protection to users).
123. H.R. 1913, 113th Cong. (2013).
124. Id.
125. See id.
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which preferred self-regulation.126  The APPS Act had a problematic
safe harbor, “in which a company could be shielded from liability
by following a code of conduct developed through the NTIA multis-
takeholder process, even though the requirements of that code of
conduct may fall far below the substantive requirements of the
APPS Act.”127  This safe harbor might have negated the effectiveness
of the statute because companies could circumvent the protections
of the Act. The APPS Act also died in Congress.
Congress has succeeded in providing additional protection for
one specific situation: when companies collect children’s personal
information.128 The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA), passed in 1998, gives the FTC authority to issue regula-
tions and enforce the provisions of the statute.129  COPPA prohibits
websites and online services from collecting a child’s (a person
under the age of thirteen) personal information unless they comply
with the provisions of the Act.130  COPPA requires the operator of
the website or online service to provide notice of how the company
collects and uses information, in addition to operator disclosure
practices.131 The operator must obtain verifiable parental consent
for the collection, use, and dissemination of the child’s informa-
tion.132  The operator is also prohibited from conditioning any
activity, such as participating in a game or receiving a reward, on
the child disclosing more personal information than is “reasonably
necessary to participate in such activity.”133  COPPA also requires
the operator to “establish and maintain reasonable procedures to
protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal infor-
mation collected from children.”134
Congress has also included privacy provisions in other statutes to
protect specific types of information held by certain entities.  The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions to give con-
sumers privacy notices detailing the institutions’ information-
126. See Jim Edwards, Congress’s New ‘Apps Act’ Could Change How You Use Your Mobile Phone
Forever, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-apps-act-2013-
1.
127. Daniel Parisi, Mobile App Privacy: Developing Standard and Effective Privacy Tools for Con-
sumers, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 240, 260 (2014).
128. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501 et. seq.
129. Id. § 6505(a).
130. Id. § 6502(a).
131. Id. § 6502(b)(1)(A).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 6502(b)(1)(C).
134. Id. § 6502(b)(1)(D).
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sharing practices and allow consumers to opt out of certain disclo-
sures to nonaffiliated third parties.135  The Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) includes a pri-
vacy rule that regulates the use and disclosure of protected health
information.136  While these statutes provide some degree of protec-
tion, no federal bills have been enacted that comprehensively
address digital privacy concerns.
Although no federal statute protects all users from the privacy
concerns discussed above, California passed a law that provides
users with protection from the harms presented by companies’ col-
lecting and disseminating their personal information.  The
California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) mandates that
any company that collects users’ personal information must con-
spicuously post its privacy policy.137  A company’s privacy policy
must explain what personal information is collected, and list all
third parties with whom the company shares the data.138  Recent
amendments, which went into effect on January 1, 2014, also re-
quire companies to disclose “how the operator responds to Web
browser ‘do not track’ signals or other mechanisms that provide
consumers the ability to exercise choice regarding the collection of
personally identifiable information.”139  In addition, companies
must disclose whether third parties can collect users’ information
“over time and across different Web sites when a consumer uses the
operator’s Web site or service.”140
CalOPPA is the most comprehensive online privacy statute, pro-
viding transparency for users.  Unlike COPPA it protects all online
users, not just children.  CalOPPA allows California users to make
fully informed, conscientious decisions about what online services
to use and what information they are comfortable with disclosing.
The law is also broad enough to encompass modern technologies,
protecting users who use multiple devices.141  CalOPPA does have
135. See The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801 et seq. The Act does allow finan-
cial institutions to disclose consumers’ personal information “to a nonaffiliated third party to
perform services for or functions on behalf of the financial institution, including marketing
of the financial institution’s own products or services.” Id. § 6802(b)(2).
136. See The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d-1, et seq. The HIPAA Privacy Rules are codified at 45 C.F.R. 164.
137. California Online Privacy Protection Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575 et. seq.
138. Id. § 22575(b)(1).
139. Id. § 22575(b)(5).
140. Id. § 22575(b)(6).
141. See Jane Hils-Shea, California’s Do-Not-Track Law Presents Challenges to Online Businesses,
FROST BROWN TODD LLC (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.frostbrowntodd.com/resources-1619
.html.
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some shortcomings, however.  It does not, for instance, create a pri-
vate cause of action.142  The statute also does not require companies
to honor a user’s choice not to be tracked.143  Despite these draw-
backs, this law is a major step toward providing users with effective
privacy protection against companies’ collection and dissemination
of personal information, although it is only effective in California.
D. FTC Regulatory Activity
The FTC oversees the implementation and operation of nongov-
ernmental privacy policies.144  The agency has the authority to
penalize companies for “not adhering to their own publicized pri-
vacy policies.”145  Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, the
FTC may sue companies for engaging in unfair or deceptive prac-
tices.146  Therefore, if a company does not comply with its own
privacy policy or if the policy is misleading, it may be subject to FTC
enforcement.  The FTC can fill in the statutory gaps in the user
privacy field; even though there is no comprehensive federal
scheme, the FTC has jurisdiction under the FTC Act over any “per-
son, partnership, or corporation” that engages in these practices.147
One paradigmatic example of FTC enforcement action is F.T.C.
v. Toysmart.com, LLC, in which the FTC sued a company that sold
customers’ personal information to third parties in contravention
of the company’s privacy policy.148  Toysmart collected personal in-
formation such as names, addresses, shopping preferences, and
data about consumers’ children, and sold it to third parties.149  Ulti-
mately, the court ordered third parties in possession of the
consumers’ personal information to delete all data and comply with
COPPA.150  The FTC successfully brought suit, although COPPA
only applied to some of the data—the information was mostly from
adult consumers.151  Despite COPPA’s limited applicability to this
case, the FTC had jurisdiction under the FTC Act and could protect
142. Id.
143. AB370: California’s “Do Not Track” Law, COOLEY LLP (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.coo-
ley.com/ab370-californias-do-not-track-law.
144. See Liebler & Chaney, supra note 12, at 162.
145. See Kuhlmann, supra note 8, at 234.
146. See FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 52–53.
147. Id. § 53(a).
148. F.T.C. v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-11341-RGS, 2000 WL 34016434, *1 (D. Mass.
July 21, 2000).
149. Id.
150. Id. at *2.
151. See id. at *1; Press Release, FTC, FTC Announces Settlement with Bankrupt Website,
Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy Violations (July 21, 2000), https://www.ftc
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the users’ personal information because of Toysmart’s failure to ad-
here to its privacy policy.152  This case demonstrates how the FTC
can provide protection even when a statute does not directly cover
all users.
The FTC has also recommended a Do Not Track mechanism,
which would allow users to make a uniform decision to prevent
companies from tracking their online activity.  The “most practical
method . . . would likely involve placing a setting similar to a persis-
tent cookie on a consumer’s browser and conveying that setting to
sites that the browser visits, to signal whether or not the consumer
wants to be tracked or receive targeted advertisements.”153  This
would offer several advantages, such as built-in privacy for online
activity, simplified choice, and increased transparency.154 The FTC’s
recommendation offers more protection to users, but it is not
mandatory for online service providers.  Companies also are not re-
quired by law to respect a user’s desire not to be tracked, unless
they state otherwise in their privacy policies.155  The drafters of the
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011 declined to include
such a mandate; Senator Kerry asserted that a Do Not Track re-
quirement would have upset the balance of consumer and industry
support.156 More problematically, this function may be more diffi-
cult to implement for mobile devices.  As discussed above,
behavioral advertisers are moving away from using cookies and are
instead utilizing people-based marketing, which is harder for users
to disable.157
Despite the agency’s efforts, FTC regulation in this field cannot
provide adequate protection to users from the various concerns re-
lated to collection and dissemination of their personal information.
The FTC has jurisdiction under the FTC Act only when a company
engages in unfair or deceptive practices.158  The agency therefore
cannot require completely transparent company practices as
.gov/news-events/press-releases/2000/07/ftc-announces-settlement-bankrupt-website-toys-
martcom-regarding.
152. See id. at *2; Kuhlmann, supra note 8, at 234.
153. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 66 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumer-protec-
tion-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer/101201privacyreport.pdf.
154. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 59, at 320–22.
155. See CHITIKA, INC., 151 F.T.C. 494 (2011) (consent order and complaint for a case
in which the FTC sued Chitika, Inc., a network advertiser engaging in behaviorally targeted
advertising, for not respecting its privacy policy option for users to opt out of receiving track-
ing cookies).
156. See Kang, supra note 122.
157. See supra Part I.A.
158. FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 52–53.
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CalOPPA does.  Even if a user is unaware of the nature and extent
of the collection and use of his or her personal information, the
FTC cannot pursue a lawsuit if the company’s practices are not un-
fair or deceptive.  As long as a company abides by its privacy policy,
it can usually avoid the FTC’s purview.159  The only other way the
agency could reach a company’s practices is for the conduct at issue
to implicate COPPA (or the privacy provisions in Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act or HIPAA).  The FTC simply cannot fill in all of the gaps
left by the federal and state statutory scheme.  Without a private
cause of action, users must hope they fall under the FTC Act,
COPPA, or CalOPPA (or a similar, applicable state law).  These laws
leave too many people without sufficient protection from the harms
of companies’ collection and dissemination of personal
information.
III. A COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL SOLUTION
This Part proposes a solution to the problems that the collection
and dissemination of users’ personal information present. A com-
prehensive federal statute is the ideal remedy to the issues raised in
Parts I and II because it would best ensure uniform consumer pro-
tection. This proposal also takes the companies’ and third parties’
interests into account to create a balanced privacy scheme. A fed-
eral law is especially important at this time because of the risks that
new technologies pose to user privacy, particularly those raised by
increased mobile usage,160 and the gaps in protection currently af-
forded to users. This Note’s proposed federal online privacy statute,
the Digital Privacy Act (DPA), will fill in the current gaps by ensur-
ing that users are aware of what happens to their information and
by providing remedies for privacy violations. The key elements of
the DPA are an electronic signature requirement, clear and con-
spicuous privacy policies, and a private cause of action. This
proposal also avoids rigidity and overly broad restrictions through
FTC enforcement, which will preserve the flexibility necessary in a
developing field. The DPA includes the below-described provisions.
159. See Ciocchetti, supra note 5, at 581. A recent Third Circuit opinion may have ex-
panded the FTC’s power to combat large-scale data breaches, however; See F.T.C. v.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 14-3514, 2015 WL 4998121 (3d Cir. Aug. 24, 2015). In 2008
and 2009, hackers obtained personal and financial information from 619,000 of Wyndham’s
consumers, resulting in $10.6 million in fraud loss. Id. at *2–3. The FTC alleged that Wynd-
ham violated the FTC Act by failing to protect consumers’ sensitive personal information.
The Third Circuit, in dismissing Wyndham’s motion to dismiss, held that the FTC has author-
ity to regulate cybersecurity. See id. at *9.
160. See supra Part I.D.
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A. Electronic Signature Requirement
As its foundation, the DPA would require companies with an on-
line presence to mandate affirmative and consensual user
acceptance to clear and conspicuous privacy policies. This require-
ment addresses the crux of the problems discussed in Part I.C: the
lack of informed consent from users.  User acceptance should take
a form that facilitates conscious acquiescence, such as having the
user input a virtual signature. One recent study on electronic signa-
tures noted that participants viewed checking an “I Accept” box as
less valid than a typed-in name or computer-generated signature.161
The virtual signature component introduces a concrete contractual
mentality to data collection and dissemination policy agreements;
most companies’ privacy policies currently only offer an “I Accept”
option rather than an opportunity for the user to sign his or her
name.
Although some users may still not devote the time to read the full
terms and conditions, a person’s signature can evoke feelings of
acceptance of a contractual agreement, unlike clicking a button,
which is seen as purely an obstacle to online activity.162  As a practi-
cal matter, the requisite technology for users to digitally sign their
name on computers and mobile devices, instead of typing it in or
having the website or app generate it, is already available.163  A sig-
nature implies intent to be bound by an agreement.164  Electronic
signatures also have federally recognized legal effect, which solidi-
fies their legitimacy.165  Both companies and users would most likely
prefer that a user only be required to sign once, to ensure an effi-
cient online experience for future uses.  The DPA would not
require a signature for each subsequent use in order to take advan-
tage of the benefits of data collection and dissemination.166  This
may create problems for public devices, such as computers in a pub-
lic library.  The DPA would also require a company’s agreement,
161. See Eileen Chou, Paperless and Soulless: E-signatures Diminish the Signer’s Presence and
Decrease Acceptance, 6(3) SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY SCIENCE 343, 346–47 (Dec.
2, 2014), http://spp.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/11/13/1948550614558841.full.pdf+
html.
162. See Smithers, supra note 39.
163. See, e.g., Jorge Rodriguez, Signature: Sign Your Digital Documents, APPSTORM (Sept. 15,
2011), http://mac.appstorm.net/general/document-signing-made-digital-with-signature/.
164. See 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 6:44 (4th ed. 1990).
165. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-
7006 (2000). The statute defines “electronic signature” as “an electronic sound, symbol, or
process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or
adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.” Id. § 7006(5).
166. See supra Part I.B.
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detailing its collection and dissemination practices, to let a user sig-
nify whether a device is private or public.  If the device is public, a
company would have to request a user’s signature for any subse-
quent uses.
B. Clear and Conspicuous Privacy Policies
Clear and conspicuous privacy policies are a key requirement of
the DPA because they are necessary for actual informed consent.
Agreement to a privacy policy is essentially contractual; however,
the user’s acceptance of this implicit contract is called into question
by online providers’ practices.  Valid acceptance of an offer re-
quires knowledgeable consent, which is not present in many users’
online agreements.  As discussed above, companies often make
users go to additional lengths to access their policies.167  Further
exacerbating the issue, policies are often needlessly complex and
written in legalese.168  The Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of
2011 recognized this problem, calling for transparent company pri-
vacy policies.169 Moreover, a recent study demonstrated that users,
when informed of how often apps access and share their informa-
tion, take affirmative steps to protect their privacy.170 Taking this
study into account, if online providers implement clear and con-
spicuous terms and conditions, then users will be able to make an
informed decision about whether to agree to participate in them
and what protective measures to take. Accordingly, the DPA would
require users to agree to clear and conspicuous policies on collec-
tion and dissemination practices before site or app use.
A “clear” privacy policy should be written in plain English,171 not
complex legalese.  “Conspicuous” means that the company’s policy
must be located where a user is reasonably likely to see it.  Clear
and conspicuous privacy policies should provide adequate notice
for users to understand how companies will use their information.
As an effective means of notifying users of the important parts of
their privacy policies, the DPA would provide for a bullet-point
summary in the same section where a user provides an electronic
167. See Ciocchetti, supra note 5, at 586.
168. Id. at 587–89.
169. Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. § 201 (2011).
170. Byron Spice, Study Shows People Act to Protect Privacy When Told How Often Phone Apps
Share Personal Information, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY NEWS (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www
.cmu.edu/news/stories/archives/2015/march/privacy-nudge.html.
171. See Ciocchetti, supra note 5, at 632.
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signature, with a conspicuous link to the full policy.  This summa-
rized bullet-point privacy policy must, at a minimum, state the types
of information the website collects, the uses that such information
will be put to, specific third parties that will receive the information
or that will directly collect information from the user, and, in gen-
eral, the measures that the company takes to protect users’
information. The bullet-point summary should be limited to one
page, unless more space is necessary to provide the required
information.
Such a concise, clear, and fully informative approach to convey-
ing companies’ privacy policies and precautionary strategies is
critical given the recent increase in large-scale data breaches.172
The DPA would not require that companies disclose specific data
protection methods (i.e., it would not provide data breach perpe-
trators with a guide to circumventing a company’s security).  If
companies must generally disclose to the public what protections
they are providing, however, they may be incentivized to strengthen
security measures.  This type of motivation may help prevent inci-
dents such as the IRS’ data breach.173  As Justice Sonia Sotomayor
once remarked, “Reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of
contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those
terms by consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is to have
integrity and credibility.”174
C. Private Cause of Action
The DPA would also create a private cause of action for users
affected by a company’s violations of the provisions. This compo-
nent would reinforce the contractual nature of a user’s acceptance
of terms and conditions.  Users do not currently view privacy poli-
cies as contracts; the DPA’s electronic signature and clear and
conspicuous policy requirements ideally would change that mind-
set.  When two individuals contract with one another, one party
may sue the other for breach.  Since acceptance of a company’s
privacy policy is a form of contractual agreement, users should be
able to sue for an online provider’s breach of its terms and condi-
tions.  This would enable users to take matters into their own hands
and pursue claims that the FTC may not be able to litigate.  Without
172. See supra Part I.C.
173. See supra Introduction.
174. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002).
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this comprehensive statute, a user would depend on the FTC’s au-
thority under the FTC Act, COPPA, or a state privacy law such as
CalOPPA.  Despite the FTC’s expertise in this area, it simply cannot
catch each privacy policy violation.
A private cause of action would alleviate this problem by ensur-
ing maximum privacy coverage for users.175 Unlike the Commercial
Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, this provision would also give
users leverage with the capacity to enter into class action lawsuits
against companies that have violated the provisions of the statute.176
The threat of a class action lawsuit, especially for online providers
with vast numbers of users, will encourage compliance.  This provi-
sion of the DPA shifts bargaining power to users. Currently, users
must engage in a virtual Hobson’s choice177 between (1) accepting
a policy and allowing their personal information to be mined, or
(2) foregoing a useful, perhaps essential service.  Although compa-
nies may oppose this element of the DPA, they would still retain
sufficient leverage to incentivize user agreement to data collection
and dissemination policies, as discussed below.
D. FTC Enforcement
The FTC has familiarity with issues related to the collection and
dissemination of personal information, and should maintain an ac-
tive role in the enforcement of the DPA. Accordingly, the DPA will
confer primary enforcement power on the FTC to ensure that DPA
privacy protections succeed. The agency will prove critical as both
COPPA and the FTC Act have provided the agency with the requi-
site expertise, and the FTC has created the Division of Privacy and
Identity Protection, which oversees consumer privacy, identity theft,
and information security issues.178 This division enforces COPPA
and Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive
175. Cf. Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An
Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. Rev. 879 (2008). While the FTC has enforcement power for
antitrust violations, “[V]irtually the only way to secure redress for the victims of antitrust vio-
lations is through private litigation. . . . [P]rivate enforcement also plays a significant role in
deterring antitrust violations.” Id. at 883–84. The authors conclude that private enforcement
complements governmental regulation of the industry. Id. at 905–07.
176. See Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act, S. 799, 112th Cong. § 406 (2011).
177. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1076 (1986) (defining a Hobson’s
choice as “an apparent freedom of choice where there is no real alternative”).
178. Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc
.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-privacy-
and-identity (last visited Jan. 3, 2016).
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acts or practices.179  The FTC already has an existing framework for
enforcing user privacy laws; it only lacks a specific federal mandate.
Notably, the DPA’s private cause of action does not remove the
FTC’s ability to bring lawsuits against companies; individuals can
still defer to the agency.  Unlike individual parties, the FTC has the
resources to investigate material violations of the statute.  The
agency has demonstrated its inclination and ability to successfully
prevent companies’ deceptive monitoring and tracking practices.180
As would have been the case under the Do Not Track Me Online
Act of 2011, the DPA would authorize the FTC to prescribe exact
standards for online providers to follow.181  This will allow optimal
flexibility in applying the goals of the Act to new technologies.
E. Companies’ Interests
Although users require more protection from the statutory
scheme, companies’ interests must also be taken into account.  The
collection and dissemination of users’ personal information is a
critical practice for businesses.182  It also provides numerous bene-
fits for users such as tailored advertising.183  The DPA will not
prevent companies from using behavioral advertising or people-
based marketing or disseminating personal information. Compa-
nies will only have to adjust how their privacy policies are displayed
and respect users’ choices.  This proposal does not strip companies
of all bargaining power; they may still restrict the functionality of
their services or even deny access if users do not agree to their data
policies.  If the service is valuable, consumers will most likely con-
tinue to use it and agree to the terms and conditions.  Users already
make similar valuations for paid-subscription services, so it will not
place too high a burden on either side.
The DPA would also not incorporate the FTC’s Do Not Track
proposal, because it would restrict or eliminate the advantages of
179. Id.
180. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Sears Settles FTC Charges Regarding
Tracking Software (June 4, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/06/
sears-settles-ftc-charges-regarding-tracking-software (describing a settlement with Sears after
the FTC alleged that Sears’ software would “monitor consumers’ online secure ses-
sions–including sessions on third parties’ Web sites–and collect information transmitted in
those sessions, such as the contents of shopping carts, online bank statements, drug prescrip-
tion records, video rental records, library borrowing histories, and the sender, recipient,
subject, and size for web-based e-mails,” in addition to tracking users’ offline activity).
181. Do Not Track Me Online Act, H.R. 654, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).
182. See, e.g., Soma et al., supra note 33, at 12; Solove, supra note 37, at 970.
183. See supra Part I.B.
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data collection and dissemination by preventing companies from
tracking user activity and delivering a personalized online experi-
ence.184  It might also force online providers to categorically deny
access to their services to users who use the Do Not Track mecha-
nism.185  The sponsors of the Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act
of 2011 also opted against a Do Not Track mechanism, feeling that
such a function would result in the loss of industry support.186  To
ensure a compromise between users’ and companies’ interests, and
to encourage online providers’ compliance, the FTC’s Do Not
Track proposal would not be adopted.  Do Not Track mechanisms
can also be disregarded by websites, calling into question their
effectiveness.187
In light of the intensified risks that mobile usage presents to con-
sumers, it is important that Congress enact a comprehensive
statutory scheme to ensure uniform protection.  Current practices
have proven insufficient to insulate users from the drawbacks of col-
lection and dissemination of their personal information.  The
current system of FTC regulation and state privacy laws contains too
many gaps in coverage.  With the emergence of new technologies
and unforeseen privacy consequences, Congress must establish a
framework for consumer privacy protection that achieves a balance
between the interests of users and companies.  With a statutory
foundation in place that creates an electronic signature require-
ment, a clear and conspicuous privacy policy requirement, and a
private cause of action, which ensures a continued role for FTC reg-
ulatory power, Congress would both maximize benefits for
companies and users and mitigate the disadvantages of collecting
and disseminating users’ personal information.
CONCLUSION
Advances in technology relating to the collection and dissemina-
tion of personal information have led to many benefits for both
users and companies.  Users take advantage of these practices to
enjoy a personalized and efficient online experience.  Companies
use behavioral marketing and advertising, resulting in increased
184. Molly Jennings, To Track or Not to Track: Recent Legislative Proposals to Protect Consumer
Privacy, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 193, 200 (2012).
185. Id.
186. See Kang, supra note 122.
187. See Cooper Quintin, HealthCare.gov Sends Personal Data to Dozens of Tracking Websites,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/
01/healthcare.gov-sends-personal-data.
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sales and more efficient advertising strategies.  Since aggregated
personal information has actual economic value, companies also
benefit from collecting and selling digital profiles of their custom-
ers.  While these practices are entrenched in Web and mobile usage
and facilitate modern lifestyles, they pose significant and tangible
risks to users.
The current state of online privacy law does not provide users
with sufficient security.  Tort and contract law do not provide ade-
quate remedies for users.  There are simply too many gaps in the
coverage of federal and state statutes and FTC regulation.  Even if
recently proposed statutes had been enacted, their solutions would
not have completely solved the problems discussed in this Note.
These failed proposals did not take both users’ and companies’ in-
terests into account and would have still exposed individuals to the
risks of data collection and dissemination.  These proposed laws
also did not fully address the issues presented by mobile usage.
This Note attempts to address the heart of the problem: users do
not read privacy policies, rendering their knowledge and consent
illusory.  Aspects of contract law provide an informative context to
solve this problem.  Although it will be difficult to change user ten-
dencies, the DPA’s electronic signature, clear and conspicuous
privacy policies, and private cause of action requirements will en-
courage informed decision-making in the context of Internet and
app usage. If companies clearly state their data collection and dis-
semination practices and users are required to do more than just
click “I Accept,” users may gradually pay closer attention to the pri-
vacy risks.  This would allow a user to make a fully informed choice,
deciding whether the utility of the website or app is worth the min-
ing of his or her personal data.  The DPA would also maintain a
balance in taking companies’ interests into account.  By excluding a
Do Not Track requirement, the DPA preserves the advantages that
companies derive from collecting and disseminating personal infor-
mation.  Its flexibility would allow companies to continue enjoying
these benefits.  The DPA fills in the statutory and regulatory gaps,
while ensuring a balance between user and industry interests.  With
recent changes in technology and large-scale data breaches, it is es-
sential that Congress provides a comprehensive statutory scheme as
discussed in this Note.

